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ENGLISH LAW AS AN EXPONENT OF ENGLISH
HISTORYS PECIALIZATION is commonly said to be the characteristic
feature of contemporary educational development. The world
wants men who can do some one thing well or who have penetrated
far into the hidden recesses of some single field where they are able
to discover something previously unknown. We are even told that
breadth of knowledge is a mere euphemism for superficiality, and
that general culture is an antiquated relic of a simpler and less
exacting age.
It is quite certain, however, that spedialization, like most educa-
tional enthusiasms, has been much misunderstood, and has indeed
proved unprofitable if not positively injurious in its cruder forms.
Analysis, to whatever lengths it may be carried, is really only a
preliminary step in. the broader process of synthesis. Each of the
laborers on the Tower of Babel was doubtless as proficient in his
work after the confusion of tongues as before, but we are told that
the work on the Tower stopped. All were engaged in a common
task, and each was helpless when he ceased to understand what the
rest were doing. The lawyer, the financier, the historian, the sci-
entist, the engineer, the philologist, the farmer, all are laborers toil-
ing together to extend the limits of human knowledge and expand
the scope of human achievement. They must understand one
another or the work will stop.
If specialization is carried on in this liberal and catholic spirit
it will justify itself in a thousand ways. No man can know every-
thing, but he can by patient exertion broaden himself sufficiently to
make his specialized efforts count most effectively. He can under-
stand enough of the trend of human endeavor to keep himself headed
in the right direction.
The modern lawyer has always been a specialist of the broad type,
perhaps for the reason that he could not help it. Law touches life at
almost every point. To know the law one must understand men in
their myriad relations. None but a great man can be a great lawyer,
for in no other field does narrowness so quickly and so completely
bring on disaster.
But strangely enough, while the lawyer feels a keen interest in the
efforts of all his fellow men and has built up his own specialty upon
the ample foundations of universal knowledge, an understanding
of law has not commonly been considered a matter at all vital to
laymen, except to enable them to keep out of court. The reason
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for such a provincial view must be found in the prevailing ignorance
of law outside of the legal profession. If the specialist in law so
constantly draws upon the other departments of knowledge, there
is no reason why the converse should not be true. And in the fol-
lowing discussion an effort will be made to suggest how largely the
historian may profit from the study of law, and in particular how the
facts of English history may be given new significance and vitality
by an appreciative understanding of the simultaneous development of
English law.
In commenting upon the scope of the subject-matter of history,
a learned legal and historical writer, Frederic W. Maitland, says:
"The history of history seems to show that it is only late in the day
that the laws of a nation become in the historian's eyes a matter of
first rate importance. * * * No one indeed would deny the
abstract proposition that law is, to say the least, a considerable
element in national life; but in the past historians have been apt
to assume that it is an element which remains constant, or that any
variations in it are so insignificant that they may safely be neglected.
The history of external events, of wars and alliances, conquests and
annexations, the lives of kings and great men, these seem easier to
write, and for a while they are really more attractive; a few lightly
written paragraphs on 'the manners and customs of the period' may
be thrown in, but they must not be very long nor very serious. It
is but gradually that the desire comes upon us to know the men of
past times more thoroughly, to know their works and their ways.
* * * History then becomes 'constitutional;' even for the pur-
pose of studying the great men and the striking events, it must
become constitutional, must try to reproduce the political atmos-
phere in which the heroes lived and their deeds were done. But it
cannot stop there; already it has entered the realm of liw, and it
finds that realm an organized whole, one that cannot be cut up into
departments by hard and fast lines. The public law that the his-
torian wants as stage and scenery for his characters is found to
imply private law, and private law a sufficient knowledge of which
cannot be taken for granted."-
It is not my purpose to unduly emphasize the light which the
study of the laws of a people throws upon its character and
development. The teaching of history should be broad enough to
recognize the importance of all sides of national life. But I believe
there has never been a sufficient appreciation of the real wealth of
suggestive and illuminating material which is contained in the his-
'Materials for the History of English Law. By Frederick V. Maitland. (Select
Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, Vol. 2, pp. S3, 54.
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tory of English law. For the English have been pre-eminently a
legal race. In the study of Roman History Roman Law has
always occupied a prominent place. The Romans made their repu-
tation, so to speak, on their conquests and on their law. They did
not borrow their legal system, but they created it. Now the same
is true of the English, and in that respect they stand practically alone
among modern European nations. The continental nations, with the
,exception of the Scandinavians, merely appropriated the civil law
of Rome. England developed a separate, distinct and character-
istic legal-system which differed radically from the Roman law. It
grew up as 'an embodiment of the social, industrial, religious and
political experiences of the English people. It was native, and
therefore was a'manifestation of the inherent qualities of the race.
So that I believe it may be said of England far more than of any
other European nation of today that her laws are the records of
her life.
This is recognized to a limited extent in the common text-books
on English history, but the laws which are prominently referred to
are those which determine the political status of the people rather
than those which deal with the private rights of person and property.
The 'latter, however, are even more characteristic and interesting
than the former, and by a study of their growth we may see the
,close and intimate correlation which exists between the progress
,of English law and the moral, social and industrial development of
,the people.
We in this country are very familiar with the three-fold govern-
mental system which was adopted by. the authors of the Constitution
f the United States. The legislative functions of government are
lodged in one body, the judicial in another, and the executive are
separate from both. Each State in its own constitution has adopted
the same theory of the division of governmental functions. This is
the only system with which we are practically acquainted, and we
are likely to assume that it is peculiarly well adapted to our'free
institutions and to our Anglo-Saxon temperament and traditions.
As a matter of fact, it is not a system native to the English race,
but was the product of the French political philosophy current at
the time of the establishment of this nation.
According to this constitutional thiory of government all rules of
law are adopted and given force by the legislative branch, and the
sole function of the courts is to administer those rules. Now it is
a curious feature of the development of English society that the
courts have not only been the agencies for administering the laws but
have done fully as much as, and probably more than, Parliament itself
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in making them. And this making of laws by the courts has gone on
in an 'unostentatious but exceedingly effective way down to the
present time.
The system of judicial legislation here referred to is, I believe, one
of the essential and distinguishing characteristics of English law,
and it is the one aspect of English legal development which more
than any other has tended to produce an intimate and organic inter-
relation between English law and English life.
It is a fundamental maxim of English law, developed very early,
that there is no right without a remedy. Ubi jus, ibi renmedium, as
the maxim reads. In other words, every right will be protected by
the courts. If the legislature has provided a remedy such remedy
will be given in a proper case, but if the legislature has failed to do
so the courts will give a remedy which seems appropriate. The
question, therefore, with which the suitor is concerned is not whether
there is a remedy for a wrong, but whether he has any right which
has been infringed. If a.right is recognized his remedy follows as
a matter of course. Right and remedy are therefore correlative
terms. Given one, the other follows.
low the significant thing about this maxim is the order in which
the terms appear. Suppose it read, "Where there is a remedy there
is a right." The question then would be, "Is there a remedy?"
If there is none the suitor has no right. The vast difference betveen
these two positions' becomes clear by a moment's reflection.. Rights
are inherent in men; remedies are supplied by the injured party or
by his friends or by society. Rights are natural; remedies are
artificial. All men are end6wed by their Creator with certain
inalienable rights; there is no such endowment in remedies. Rights
are recognized by the moral sense and appeal to the conscience ;
remedies are mere conventional processes of which one may be as
good as another.
Now if a remedy will be granted whenever there is a right, refn-
ediesbecome purely incidental matters. One may establish his right
by an appeal.to the conscience of the court. If the judge recognizes
the fundamental justice of his case he obtains relief. Hence, under
this theory, as society develops and the social conscience defines and
recognizes new rights growing out of new situations, the remedies
must keep pace. The litigant's rights depend not on what the legis-
lature has-done, not upon any external thing whatever, but upon the
iqnate reasonableness of his demand. Every judge, as a member of
society;.interprets the social will," and the rights which society broadly
recognizes he will recognize and protect.
If, on. the other hand, the maxim were reversed, the judge would
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be obliged to look, not to the spirit working in the social. fabric, not
to the social conscience, not to moral tests, but to the existence and
character of those arbitrary, conventional and purely formal pro-
cesses which society or the state had placed at his disposal.
Inasmuch, therefore, as the English moral sense and spirit of
justice early formulated and insisted upon the notion that "the right
was the main thing, the remedy secondary, a foundation was laid for
the systematic development of English law through the action, of
the judges in passing upon cases as they were presented for trial.
The suitor had to show the justice of his claim; if he did that he won
his case and his remedy followed as an incident.
Now, it is very obvious that if many courts passed upon many
cases, and the success of a party's claim depended upon so vague and
ill-defined a criterion as the judge's sense of justice, the law might
soon be expected to present a most checkered appearance. Matters
which would appeal to the conscience of one judge would not appeal
to another. The rights of litigants might therefore be expected to
vary in different local jurisdictions and to change with each change
in the personnel of the courts.
But this did not happen. If it had the legislature would doubtless
have stepped in and attempted to limit the discretion of the judges by
a legislative enumeration of personal rights. Instead the judges
developed a system of uniformity.by a resort to precedents. And this
,is the second great characteristic of English law to which I wish
to refer.
English law is primarily the product of litigation, not legislation.
The judges found and declared and thereby established the rights of
parties. If a man considered that he had been wronged by another
he went into court for a remedy. On what did he base his hope of
receiving what he sought? On two things: (i) the inherent justice
of his cause; (2) the fact that some 'other man had once sued his
neighbor in a similar case and had recovered. These were the two
reasons which led a plaintiff to go to law. They were equally the
two factors which determined the action of the judge in disposing
of the ase. But the judges, 'like all conscientious men who are
habitually required to pass upon the rights of others, were con-
servative. The plaintiff might seem to have a just case, but on the
other hand the defendant might have acted in good faith and intended
no wrong. Should the defendant be made to suffer or were there
extenuating circumstances which should operate td excuse-? Most
contests have two sides. A just decision is usually a difficult thing
to reach. judges are human and fallible. To decide a hard .case
entirely on principle, without further assistance, is a hazardous under-
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taking. What more natural than for the judge to investigate the
holdings of other judges in similar cases to see what help could be
derived from their observations and analyses? So arose the system
of reference to precedents. If there were no prior case in point the
plaintiff might nevertheless succeed if his right was entirely clear,
but in a doubtful controversy his position was immensely strength-
ened by showing that the right he claimed had already been judi-
cially recognized and enforced.
It is a natural human trait to endeavor to shift responsibility upon
others rather than to carry it one's self, particularly when one's acts
will seriously affect the rights of third persons and no element of
self-interest complicates the situation. At least the judicial trend
has always -been in that direction, and when the system of reference
to precedents became well established the judges showed an increas-
ing reluctance to recognize new rights not based on former adjudica-
tions. More and more rarely did a suitor succeed who went into
court with nothing but the inherent justice of his case to present to
the judge; and more and more rirely did he try it. A precedent must
be found, and the ingenuity of lawyers and judges devoted itself to
analyzing former cases to see whether or not they could be deemed
to sanction the particular claim in litigation. If no case could be
found which disclosed the same state of facts', it was argued that at
least the principle involved in some reported case was identical with
that sought to be invoked, and old cases in this way were enlarged
in their operation and effect as authorities, and were used to sup-
port claims of which the judges who decided them never drtamed.
But the conservatism of the courts constituted a barrier in the
way of a really liberal expansion of the laiv in this way. Standing
as they did with their eyes fixed on the past, solving contemporary
problems with the crude instruments of an outgrown age, it was not
strange that the judges little by little became narrow and technical,
and failed to respond to the new demands of a developing society.
Pomeroy says that "the history of civilized jurisprudence can show
nothing of the same kind comparable with the blind conservatism
with which the common law judges were accustomed to regard the
rules and doctrines which had once been formulated by a precedent,
and the stubborn resistance which they interposed to any departure.
from or change in either the spirit or the form of the law which had
been thus established."
'2
.And Spence, contrasting the plastic developing period of the com-
n16n law with the later rigid and fixed form in which it became cast,
declares that "As long as the common law was in the course of for-
2Pomeroy Eq. Jur., xS.
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mation, and therefore continued to be a lex non. scriptca, it was
capable, as indeed it ever continued to be to some extent, of not only
being extended to cases not expressly provided for, but which were
within the spirit of the existing law, but also of having the principles
of equity applied to it by the judges in their decisions, as circum-
stances arose which called for the application of such principles.
But in the course of time a series of precedents was established by
the decisions or responsa, as Bracton calls them, of the judges,
which were considered of almost equally binding authority on
succeeding judges as were the acts of the legislature, and it became
difficult to make new precedents without interfering with those which
had already been established. Hence (though new precedents have
ever continued to be made) the common law soon became to a great
extent a lex scripta positive and inflexible; so that the rule of justice
could not accommodate itself to every case according to the exigency
of right and justice."3
In this state of affairs it would have seemed proper, perhaps, for
Parliament to take a hand and by legislative enactment strike off
the shackles which were killing the free spirit of the law. An effort
of this kind was in fact made. But that was not the English way.
The law should develop from within rather than by external forcing,
and a remedy grew up which constitutes the third great characteristic
of English law, namely, the existence of chancery or equity jurisdic-
tion as separate and distinct from the common law jurisdiction.
There is no logical reason why a single court should not administer
the whole law, recognize all rights and grant all remedies. There is
absolutely no inherent necessity for dividing up personal rights into
two arbitrary classes, one called legal and the other called equitable,
and placing one class under the jurisdiction of one set of courts and
the other under the jurisdiction of another set of courts. No other
nation than the English ever devised such a scheme. But the English
did so and we have followed them, and today all the United States
courts and the courts of half the States are divided into two classes,
icourts of law and courts of equity, sitting at different times, recog-
nizing" different rights, enforcing different rules of procedure and
granting different remedies.
As to the origin of chancery jurisdiction, it is shrouded in the mists
of uncertainty, but it is clear that from early times a sort of prerog-
ative jurisdiction was retained by the king, covering cases not coming
within the ordinary scope of the common law courts. When the king
had no time to devote to the judicial matters coming before him they
were turned over to a Special Council composed of the Chancellor,
3 1 Spence Eq. Jur. 321, 322.
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the Treasurer, the Chief Justiciary and other appointees of the 
king.
And in turn the other members of the Council, being themselves
busy with affairs of state, began delegating to the Chancellor the
authority to deal with these prerogative cases. This practice grew
up gradually, and was at length confirmed by a general writ in 
the
reign of Edward III, whereby it was ordered that all such matters
as were of Grace should be referred to and dispatched by the Chan-
cellor. The principles upon which the Chancellor based his decisions
were Honesty, Equity and Conscience. Could any theory of justice
be more generous and comprehensive!
One restrictive feature of the common law practice never obtained
recognition from the Chancellor, namely the necessity of a royal writ
for the institution of suit. The common law courts could not acquire
jurisdiction of a case unless a writ first issued. The writs were rigid
and formal documents'strictly limited in their scope to certain specific
kinds of cases, and when a new case arose, for which there was 
no
suitable writ, the plaintiff had no way of getting into court 
at all
except through the liberality of the judges in stretching some old
writ to cover the analogous new case. For a while this was done,
but when the common law judges became technical and narrow 
in
their construction of precedents they also lost their broad and tolerant
practice respecting the use of writs, and suitors found themselves
bound with a double chain, the identical writ and the identical pre-
cedent.
The Chancellor was free from these restrictions. What, then,
more natural tha' for the suitor who found no relief in the common
law courts to take his case to the Chancellor! And so arose the
chancery jurisdiction supplementing that of the common law, and as
it grew in volume chancery judges were appointed to help the Chan-
cellor dispatch the business. If a suitor had an adequate remedy
at law he was not permitted to go into chancery, and such is still the
rule, but if he had no standing before the common law judges he
was welcomed in the Chancellor's court of conscience.
Naturally the chancery became very popular and the common law
courts were more and more neglected. And equally natural was the
feeling which began to develop among the common law judges that
they were killifig their own courts by driving suitors into chancery.
Acordingly they began to compete for business and little by little
dropped the technical and antiquated notions which had made com-
mon law administration something of a mockery of justice. But the
reipect for precedent was still sufficient to restrain the common law
courts from a radical departure from their immemorial practices and
from taking up the novel and foreign remedies which the chancery
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had largely adopted from the law of Rome. So the two systems lived
and grew together, each supreme in its own field, each doing its own
work in securing to the people of England full and adequate protec-
tion to person and property. And today, in many States, if one wishes
to know whether his rights in a given case are legal or equitable
and whether he must go into a court of law or may appeal to the
conscience of the Chancellor, he must consult the decisions of the old
law and chancery judges who sat in England during the last three
hundred years.
It would be interesting, after this general consideration of con-
spicuous characteristics, to follow out some of the details of the
common law and equity development, to trace the evolution of legal
standards of personal conduct, to see how the specific principles of.
the law have exacted from men the most scrupulous regard for
honesty and integrity, and to see how legal standards have tended to
lead rather than follow current practices. It would be interesting to
follow the development of the separate branches of the law, to see
how the liability for doing a wrongful act was extended to cover th6
careless doing of a rightful act, and how this in turn led to the rule
imposing liability for the failure to do an act which should have
been done, thus producing the modern law of negligence.
It would be full of Illuminating suggestions to trace the law of
fraud from its grosser earlier forms to the modern refined doctrines
of constructive fraud, an evolutionary process that well illustrates
the severity of the moral principles which recognized law as a
branch of ethics. One would gain a new respect for the high
character of the English race by following the steadily rising ideals
of the trust relation which the courts have brought to so lofty a
plane that one is not permitted to occupy a position of trust under
conditions which in their nature even tend to promote dishonesty,
though he show that his conduct is wholly exemplary and without
a taint of fraud. The industrial development of England is nowhere
more accurately depicted than in the growth of the law of partner-
ship, negotiable instruments and -bailments. And in more modern
times the rise of that great instrument for the accomplishment of
vast financial'undertakings, the corporation, throws a flood of light
upon the industrial revolution in the toils of which we are still
struggling. But it is sought here merely to show in a general way
that the history of English law is a peculiarly intimate part of the
history of the English people, and that a knowledge of one is essen-
tial to a real understanding of the other.
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Law is not something apart from life. It is not an esoteric
mystery whose secrets are revealed only to the initiated. It is not
even particularly technical. Everyone who will may read it and
understand it, and among all who do so none will find it more
illuminating than the student of English history.
EDsoq R. SUNDERLAND.
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.
